Moonwell Lending (Base): control-plane safety record
2 indexed control-plane surfaces for Moonwell Lending (Base), each pinned to a canonical Base block and compared with what the protocol documents. Contract: 0xfBb21d0380beE3312B33c4353c8936a0F13EF26C.
What differs
Changed / discrepant
- Comptroller pauseGuardian = 2-of-4 Safe (Constitution: pause = Security Council 3-of-5): Unitroller (0xfBb21d0380beE3312B33c4353c8936a0F13EF26C).pauseGuardian() = 2-of-4 Safe 0x5B710010586C1b728B047c3E42473c700eeA4026 (v1.4.1); observed vs Moonwell DAO Constitution 8.1: 'The Security Council has the power to execute any pause functionality, or perform other required actions with no delay ... documented
Show the full onchain evidence
Unitroller (0xfBb21d0380beE3312B33c4353c8936a0F13EF26C).pauseGuardian() = 2-of-4 Safe 0x5B710010586C1b728B047c3E42473c700eeA4026 (v1.4.1); 1 of its 4 owner addresses is also an owner of the 3-of-5 Security Council Safe 0x446342AF4F3bCD374276891C6bb3411bf2F8779E. borrowCapGuardian() = supplyCapGuardian() = 2-of-4 Safe 0x08eDEbFFaE68970DCf751baa826182b3a4aCFC05.
Show the full documented text
Moonwell DAO Constitution 8.1: 'The Security Council has the power to execute any pause functionality, or perform other required actions with no delay ... Performing any Emergency Action requires a 3-of-5 approval from the Security Council.'
Matched
- Safe threshold: 3-of-5
- Unitroller admin = TemporalGovernor (24h proposal delay), owned by the 3-of-5 Security Council: matches the documentation
Control-plane scorecard
Delta Docs and chain differ
- Upgradeability
- Not determined · Upgrade path not in the published records
- Timelock floor
- Moderate · 1d minimum enforced delay across control surfacesEvidence: moonwell-temporal-governor-24h-security-council-3of5-s18: observed_delay_seconds = 86400
- Signer quorum
- Moderate · Lowest controlling quorum: 2-of-4Evidence: moonwell-pause-guardian-2of4-safe-s18: … (0xfBb21d0380beE3312B33c4353c8936a0F13EF26C).pauseGuardian() = 2-of-4 Safe 0x5B710010586C1b728B047c3E42473c700eeA4026 …
- Emergency / freeze scope
- Strong · Pause / freeze authority scoped behind a multi-signer controller (2-of-4)Evidence: moonwell-pause-guardian-2of4-safe-s18: Unitroller (0xfBb21d0380beE3312B33c4353c8936a0F13EF26C).pauseGuardian() = 2-of-4 Safe 0x5B710010586C1b728B047c3E42473c700eeA4026 (v1.4.1)
- Docs-vs-chain parity
- Weak · Documentation differs from the chain (parameter delta)
Each slice is derived only from the pinned records on this page and their controller facts (/api/v1/scorecards.json). A hollow slice is not determined by the published evidence (never a guess); docs-vs-chain parity is uncompared for RPC-observed protocols. How to read it.
Check it live (free)
The pre-flight API re-reads the controller, proxy and capabilities of one contract at the latest block. No key, no wallet. The score rates that single contract, not the whole protocol.
curl -s "https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/check/preflight?chain=base&address=0xfBb21d0380beE3312B33c4353c8936a0F13EF26C"
import requests
r = requests.get("https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/check/preflight",
params={"chain": "base", "address": "0xfBb21d0380beE3312B33c4353c8936a0F13EF26C"})
print(r.json()["verdict"])pacta_check_preflight({"chain": "base", "address": "0xfBb21d0380beE3312B33c4353c8936a0F13EF26C"})Comptroller pauseGuardian = 2-of-4 Safe (Constitution: pause = Security Council 3-of-5)
Observed onchain. Unitroller (0xfBb21d0380beE3312B33c4353c8936a0F13EF26C).pauseGuardian() = 2-of-4 Safe 0x5B710010586C1b728B047c3E42473c700eeA4026 (v1.4.1); 1 of its 4 owner addresses is also an owner of the 3-of-5 Security Council Safe 0x446342AF4F3bCD374276891C6bb3411bf2F8779E. borrowCapGuardian() = supplyCapGuardian() = 2-of-4 Safe 0x08eDEbFFaE68970DCf751baa826182b3a4aCFC05.
Documented. Moonwell DAO Constitution 8.1: 'The Security Council has the power to execute any pause functionality, or perform other required actions with no delay ... Performing any Emergency Action requires a 3-of-5 approval from the Security Council.'
cast call 0xfBb21d0380beE3312B33c4353c8936a0F13EF26C \ "pauseGuardian()" \ --block 57842915 --rpc-url "$BASE_RPC_URL" cast block 57842915 --field hash --rpc-url "$BASE_RPC_URL" # expect 0x7ae27f2be8e931c33ac284c8d5c548c8fd7a68f08e18bb372c70e2ca3b4bd129
Unitroller admin = TemporalGovernor (24h proposal delay), owned by the 3-of-5 Security Council
Observed onchain. Unitroller (0xfBb21d0380beE3312B33c4353c8936a0F13EF26C).admin() = TemporalGovernor 0x8b621804a7637b781e2BbD58e256a591F2dF7d51 (pendingAdmin() = 0); TemporalGovernor proposalDelay() = 86400s, owner() = 3-of-5 Safe 0x446342AF4F3bCD374276891C6bb3411bf2F8779E; allTrustedSenders(2) (Ethereum) = [MultichainGovernor 0x8769B70ac7c93AF0e75de0D69877709B66d75838], allTrustedSenders(16) (Moonbeam) = []. Context, not compared: permissionlessUnpauseTime() = 2592000s (30d), while the moonwell-contracts-v2 developer docs say a pause blocks proposals 'for a period of ten days'; the governance pages still describe proposals executed on Moonbeam.
Documented. Moonwell DAO Constitution: '**Cross-chain Timelock Period**: 24 hours.' and 'Performing any Emergency Action requires a 3-of-5 approval from the Security Council.'
cast call 0xfBb21d0380beE3312B33c4353c8936a0F13EF26C \ "admin()" \ --block 57842915 --rpc-url "$BASE_RPC_URL" cast block 57842915 --field hash --rpc-url "$BASE_RPC_URL" # expect 0x7ae27f2be8e931c33ac284c8d5c548c8fd7a68f08e18bb372c70e2ca3b4bd129
Control-plane badge: Parameter Delta
This badge is amber because at least one Base-EAS-attested surface of Moonwell Lending (Base) differs from what the protocol documents. It turns to the neutral Aligned · Base EAS shield only when the on-chain state or the documentation changes and the two match at a new finalized block, whoever requests the re-check.
Embed this badge (it updates when the status changes):
[](https://pacta.wtf/protocols/moonwell-lending-base/)
<a href="https://pacta.wtf/protocols/moonwell-lending-base/"><img src="https://pacta.wtf/badges/moonwell-lending-base.svg" alt="Pacta Control Plane: Parameter Delta" height="20"></a>
Badge: https://pacta.wtf/badges/moonwell-lending-base.svg · live: https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/badges/moonwell-lending-base.svg.
Maintaining Moonwell Lending (Base)? Verify and reconcile the record
Two paths, both public. A free doc-update notice asks the maintainers to correct the documentation or the onchain parameter; anyone can send it. A Full Control-Plane Dossier ($2,500–$5,000 USDC, 24h SLA) re-reads the multisig and timelock control planes on archive RPCs and prepares an upstream docs reconciliation PR. Either way the classification changes only when the onchain state or the documentation aligns at a new finalized block.
Need procurement paperwork? Request a commercial invoice (PDF).